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FORUM CHOICE CLAUSE 
Songling Yang1 
Jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs are increasingly 
serious because of the proliferation of RTAs. Among suggestions to 
resolve these jurisdictional overlaps, the forum choice clause is 
considered by this article as an effective and fundamental method. When 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs happen, the forum 
choice clause brings clarity and precision concerning how an 
appropriate forum to resolve these overlapping disputes is justified by 
WTO panels or its Appellate Body. Using case analyses and comparison 
of legal texts, this article considers two measures to offer a forum choice 
clause in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. One measure is to amend 
the WTO legal texts to provide WTO panels or its Appellate Body with 
the legal basis to apply forum choice clauses of RTAs. The other measure 
is to explicitly stipulate a forum choice clause in the WTO legal texts. 
This thesis puts great emphasis on how to implement these two measures 
and to settle pertinent obstacles. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
As the blossom of RTAs (Regional Trade Agreements) spreads 
around the world, the overlapping of regional trade systems with the 
WTO (World Trade Organization) is more and more serious. “As of 15 
June 2014, some 585 notifications of RTAs (counting goods, services 
and accessions separately) had been received by the GATT/WTO. Of 
these, 379 were in force.”2 To some extent, these RTAs form a 
competitive relationship with the WTO. This competitive relationship 
causes RTAs to invest more resources into the development of their own 
RTAs and then reduces their enthusiasm for constructing the WTO. For 
  
 2. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 31, 2014),   
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. 
2014] WTO and RTAs: The Forum Choice Clause 109 
 
instance, the EU (European Union) puts more knowledge and enthusiasm 
into its own EU laws rather than those of the WTO although the 
provisions of the WTO have already covered much of the substantive 
parts of the EU laws.3 Bhagwati describes this kind of overlapping 
between the WTO and RTAs as “spaghetti bowl,” in order to indicate the 
chaos brought by this overlapping.4 There is no effective rule to 
harmonize this overlapping. Article XXIV of GATT (General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariff) 1994 is obviously too narrow because it just focuses 
on the formation stage of RTAs.5 However, the current situation is that 
many RTAs are already in the stage of “operating,” as opposed to merely 
being in a “formation” stage.6 
Jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs directly reflect 
one of many results brought about by the overlap between the WTO and 
the RTAs. More and more similar or even identical legal and factual 
claims are triggered before a variety of dispute settlement forums.7 This 
  
 3. See generally Joseph H. H. Weiler, Cain and Abel, Convergence and 
Divergence in International Trade Law, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA: 
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1-4 (J. H. H. Weiler ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press Inc., New York, 2000). 
 4. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 112-13 (Princeton University Press 
2002) (“Looking at this explosion when the number of PTAs was yet barely in three 
digits, I remarked that the situation was turning into a ‘spaghetti bowl’: a messy maze of 
preferences as PTAs formed between two countries, with each having bilaterals with 
other and different countries, the latter in turn bonding with yet others, each in turn 
having different rules of origin (as required by the preferences sought to be given and 
taken, without ‘leaks’ to non-members via entry into members) for different sectors, and 
so on. I called it a spaghetti bowl because it is an unruly mass of criss-crossing strings 
that, in any case, is beyond my capabilities.”); see also JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ANNE 
KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 2-3 (AEI Press 
1995).  
 5. Colin Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. the WTO: A Proposal for Reform 
of Article XXIV to Counter This Institutional Threat, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 267, 
287-94 (2005); see also Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and 
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 
435-45 (2001); see generally Zakir Hafez, Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the 
Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on RTAs, 79 N.D. L. REV. 879 (2003). 
 6. See Cho, supra note 5, at 452. 
 7. See generally Yuval Shany, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Oxford Univ. Press 2003). 
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phenomenon has been proved by many international cases, such as the 
Mexico—Soft Drink case, the Argentina—Poultry case and so on.8 
Because there are no forum choice clauses in the WTO covered 
agreements, the Appellate Body in the Mexico—Soft Drink case 
mentioned that “it [wa]s difficult to see how a panel would fulfill that 
obligation if it declined to exercise validly established jurisdiction and 
abstained from making any finding on the matter before it.”9 In the 
Argentina—Poultry case, the WTO Panel considered that there was no 
limitation on Brazil to “bring WTO dispute settlement proceedings in 
respect of measures previously challenged through MERCOSUR,” also 
known as the Southern Common Market.10 In both cases, the WTO DSB, 
also known as the Dispute Settlement Body, strongly upheld its 
jurisdictions although such disputes had already been settled in the 
forums of RTAs. The main reason is that there is no forum choice clause 
in the WTO legal texts. 
Agreeing with Bhagwati, Pauwelyn describes this phenomenon as a 
“spaghetti bowl” which is cooking and points out that it became the 
focus as the standstill of the WTO Doha round faced with this issue.11 
Duplicate proceedings between the WTO and RTAs will induce many 
negative impacts on the settlement of these disputes. Firstly, the 
duplicative proceedings will cause considerable expense to those states 
involved because the states have to assume the cost for proceedings 
under both the WTO DSB and the RTA’s tribunal.12 Secondly, if the 
duplicate proceedings are permitted and party does not satisfy the 
  
 8. See, e.g., Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres, WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter WT/DS332/R]; Panel Report, United 
States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter WT/DS381/R]. 
 9. Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages, ¶ 51, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006).  
 10. See Panel Report, Argentina—Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry 
from Brazil, ¶ 7.38, WT/DS241/R (Nov. 7 2001); MERCOSUR was founded in 1991 by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay with the signature of the Treaty of Asuncion. 
 11. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The 
WTO—NAFTA ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 197 (2006).  
 12. Jennifer Hillman, Conflicts Between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in 
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO—What Should the WTO do?, 42 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 193, 202 (2009). 
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proceeding or the award of the original forum, the disputing party will 
choose another dispute settlement forum. This kind of forum shopping 
will threaten the authority of international tribunals.13 Thirdly, duplicate 
proceedings will lead to double awards over the same dispute.14 Then the 
disputing parties will find it difficult to implement the recommendations 
or rulings in those awards if those recommendations or rulings are 
contrary.15   
B.  Current Solutions regarding Jurisdictional Conflicts between the 
WTO and RTAs 
Many international legal scholars and participants realize the issue of 
competition between multilateralism and regionalism.16 Based on the 
influence of regionalism on the multilateralism, some scholars further 
notice jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs therein and 
find out that there is no effective existing rule to settle these conflicts in 
current international trade system.17 Generally speaking, the researches 
  
 13. Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Salles, Forum Shopping Before International 
Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77, 83 
(2009).  
 14. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, 
Fragmentation, And Decentralization of Dispute Settlement In International Trade, 27 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 273, 287 (2006). 
 15. José Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 
TEXAS INT’L L. J. 405, 416-19 (2003); see also WT/DS332/R, supra note 8. 
 16. Some selected literatures concerning competition between multilateralism 
and regionalism are listed as follows: see JEFFREY FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS 
IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM (Inst. for Int’l Econ. 1997); ROBERT LAWRENCE, 
REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND DEEPER INTEGRATION (Brookings Inst. Wash., 
1996); Chin Leng Lim, Free Trade Agreements in Asia and Some Common Legal 
Problems, in THE WTO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 
NEGOTIATIONS, AND REGIONALISM IN ASIA 434-56 (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al.eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2007); N’gunu Tiny, Regionalism and the WTO: Mutual 
Accommodation at the Global Trading System, 11 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 126 (2005); 
John Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and the GATT, 16 THE WORLD ECONOMY 121 
(1993). 
 17. The main literature regarding jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs are listed as follows: see also Pauwelyn, supra note 11, at 197; Hillman, supra 
note 12, at 202; Caroline Henckels, Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the 
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investigating the competition between regionalism and multilateralism 
are abundant.18 However, the literatures particularly concerning 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs, especially those 
which that suggest effective solutions for this kind of jurisdictional 
conflicts, are few. 
According to the perception of this article, the research into the 
competition between multilateralism and regionalism sheds light on this 
study into resolving jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs. 
The researches concerning the influence of current regionalism on the 
development of multilateralism reveal that the building block effect of 
RTAs on the WTO outweighs their stumbling block effect.19 Such 
research provides this article with the precondition to discuss the solution 
for jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs. This 
precondition is that RTAs need not to be forbidden or replaced by a solo 
WTO system, but a more effective mechanism must be established to 
harmonize their relationship. This kind of research also proves the 
ineffectiveness of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 in dealing with the 
matters brought about by regionalism.20 Because of the insufficient rules 
in Article XXIV of GATT 1994 at this stage, there are no existing WTO 
  
WTO—FTA Nexus: A Potential Approach for the WTO, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 571 (2008); 
Joost Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and Overlaps with the WTO and Other 
Jurisdictions, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231 (2004) [hereinafter Pauwelyn, Going 
Global, Regional, or Both?]; Kyung Kwak & Gabrielle Marceau, Conference on 
Regional Trade Agreements April 26, 2002, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction 
between the WTO and RTAs, WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/sem_april02_e/marceau.pdf; Karen Alter 
& Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade 
Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 362, 363 (2006); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, supra note 14. 
 18. Id. 
 19. JOHN JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 314 (West Publ’g Corp. 3rd ed., 1995) (1977) 
[hereinafter JOHN JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS]; see also PETER ROBSON, THE ECONOMICS 
OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 200 (George Allen & Unwin 2nd ed., 1984) (1980). 
 20. See also Picker, supra note 5; Cho, supra note 5; Hafez, supra note 5.   
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provisions to directly settle jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs.21 
Those few research articles concerning jurisdictional conflicts 
between the WTO and RTAs mainly refer to the phenomenon of 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs nowadays, and then 
further touch on the solutions for these kinds of conflicts.22 Some advise 
the WTO DSB to apply general principles of international law for the 
sake of settlement of jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs, such as the res judicata principle, the comity principle, and the 
forum non conveniens principle.23 Indeed, the res judicata principle is 
well recognized as a norm of international law for the settlement of 
jurisdictional conflicts.24 The MOX Plant case shows that the comity is 
considered as the respect for the sovereignty and competence of another 
legal institution in the current public international law community.25 The 
universal application of the forum non conveniens principle all around 
the world and its detailed reference in the Interim Text of the Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments26 also reveal the possibility 
for the WTO panel or Appellate Body to apply such a principle to 
resolve its jurisdictional conflicts with RTAs. 
  
 21. Songling Yang, The Key Role of the WTO in Settling its Jurisdictional 
Conflicts with RTAs, 11 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 281, 298 (2012). 
 22. See also Pauwelyn, supra note 11; Hillman, supra note 12; Henckels, supra 
note 17; Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both?, supra note 17; Kwak & Marceau, 
supra note 17; Alter & Meunier, supra note 17; Petersmann, supra note 14.  
 23. See also Hillman, supra note 12, at 203; Henckels, supra note 17, at 584-85; 
Kwak & Marceau, supra note 17, at 8-9; Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both?, 
supra note 17, at 289-95. 
 24. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 
1920-1996, at 1655-61 (M. Nijhoff 3d ed. 1997). 
 25. The Mox Plant Case, Ireland v. United Kingdom, Order No. 3, Suspension of 
Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, 
PCA ¶ 28 (June 24, 2003). 
 26. Hague Convention on Private International Law, Summary of the Outcome of 
the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference, art. 22.1, 
June 20, 2011 (“[The] court may, on application by a party, suspend its proceedings if in 
that case it is clearly inappropriate for that court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of 
another State has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute. Such 
application must be made no later than at the time of the first defense on the merits.”). 
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However, it is still practically possible that the WTO panel or 
Appellate Body would not like to apply these general principles of 
international law to decline “to exercise validly established jurisdiction” 
when the WTO’s jurisdiction conflicts with the counterpart of the RTA 
(Regional Trade Agreement).27 The main reason is that those general 
principles of international law are not directly stipulated in the WTO 
legal texts. Then their application is not the compulsory obligation of the 
WTO panel or Appellate Body. Their application is the discretion of the 
WTO panel or Appellate Body. Currently there is no precedent that the 
WTO DSB applies these general principles of international law to settle 
its jurisdictional conflicts with RTAs. 
Others even hold the same perception as this article that the WTO 
DSB should respect forum choice clauses of RTAs and apply them to 
resolve its jurisdictional conflicts with RTAs.28 Although they suggest a 
useful method to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs, such suggestions do not analyze in detail the preconditions and 
legal bases to apply the forum choice clauses of RTAs in the WTO 
dispute settlement process. This kind of suggestion mainly focuses on the 
contribution of the forum choice clause to the settlement of jurisdictional 
conflicts.  
Although general principles of international law are considered by 
many present literary works as a convenient, faster and lower-cost way to 
settle jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs, whether to 
apply those general principles is the direction of the WTO DSB (Dispute 
Settlement Body).29 If the WTO DSB insists on its own jurisdiction and 
refuses to apply those principles, jurisdictional conflicts between the 
WTO and RTAs will still happen. In other words, uncertainty still exists 
  
 27. See WT/DS308/AB/R, supra note 9, at ¶ 51; see also Panel Report, Mexico—
Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/R, ¶ 7.4-7.9 (Mar. 16, 
2004). 
 28. Henry Gao & Chin Leng Lim, Saving the WTO from the Risk of Irrelevance: 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism as a ‘Common Good’ for RTA Disputes, 11 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 899, 906 (2008); see also Kwak & Marceau, supra note 17, at 6; see also 
Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both?, supra note 17, at 287-89. 
 29. Hillman, supra note 12, at 202; see also Henckels, supra note 17, at 584-85; 
see also Kwak and Marceau, supra note 17, at 8-9; see also Pauwelyn, Going Global, 
Regional, or Both?, supra  note 17, at 289-95. 
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when applying general principles to settle jurisdictional conflicts 
between the WTO and RTAs as suggested by many current literary 
works.30 In order to settle this uncertainty, Section 2 of this article will 
first explain why the forum choice clause should be considered here as 
the fundamental and better solution to jurisdictional conflicts among the 
given suggestions.  
In Sections 3 and 4 of this article the possibility and the legal basis for 
the WTO DSB to apply a forum choice clause will be analyzed in detail. 
In these two sections, how a forum choice clause is absorbed into WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings will also be discussed. As mentioned in 
the paragraph above, these analyses seldom appear in the former 
literature, which advises the WTO DSB to apply forum choice clauses.31 
This article focuses on how to implement the given advice and settle the 
pertinent obstacles. 
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION: THE FORUM CHOICE CLAUSE  
As the discussion above, this section will analyze why the forum 
choice clause could fundamentally settle jurisdictional conflicts between 
the WTO and RTAs compared with other suggestions. To begin with, 
this section will exhibit what is the forum choice clause. 
A. The Forum Choice Clause 
In order to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs, 
many RTAs already have their own rules for resolving jurisdictional 
conflicts, such as their forum choice clauses.32 According to the opinion 
  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, ASEAN-China, art. 2.6, 
2004, available at  
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/agreement-on-
dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-framework-agreement-on-comprehensive-
economic-co-operation-between-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-and-the-
people-s-republic-of-china-5 (“Once dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated 
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of this article, these forum clauses could be utilized by the WTO panel or 
Appellate Body to settle jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs. In order to design a forum choice clause in the WTO legal texts, 
the WTO could also use the structure and contents of these clauses for 
reference.  
The forum choice clause of a particular RTA usually allows the 
settlement of a dispute either in its own forum or in any other forum at 
the discretion of the complaining party, such as the NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement), Chile-Mexico Free Trade Agreement 
and so on. In order to avoid jurisdictional overlap, some of those forum 
choice clauses are further transformed into exclusive forum clauses, in 
addition to the choice of forum clause. For instance, Israel-US (United 
States) Free Trade Agreement stipulates that “[i]f the conciliation panel 
under this Agreement or any other applicable international dispute 
settlement mechanism has been invoked by either Party with respect to 
any matter, the mechanism invoked shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
that matter.”33 The Article 2.6 of Agreement on DSM (Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism) of ACFTA (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and China Free Trade Area) also has the similar stipulation.34 
  
under this Agreement or under any other treaty to which the parties to a dispute are 
parties concerning a particular right or obligation of such parties arising under the 
Framework Agreement or that other treaty, the forum selected by the complaining party 
shall be used to the exclusion of any other for such dispute.”); see also Agreement on the 
Establishment of A Free Trade Area between the Government of Israel and the 
Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Isr., art. 19.1.f, Apr. 22, 1985, 
available at  
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005439.asp. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Framework Agreement 
on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the People’s Republic of China, ASEAN-China, art. 2.6, 2004, available at 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/agreement-on-
dispute-settlement-mechanism-of-the-framework-agreement-on-comprehensive-
economic-co-operation-between-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-and-the-
people-s-republic-of-china-5 (“Once dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated 
under this Agreement or under any other treaty to which the parties to a dispute are 
parties concerning a particular right or obligation of such parties arising under the 
Framework Agreement or that other treaty, the forum selected by the complaining party 
shall be used to the exclusion of any other for such dispute.”).   
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However, there are no forum choice clauses in the WTO legal texts. 
The WTO endows its judicial body with full jurisdiction on matters 
raised in its covered agreement.35 This condition could be reflected from 
the Article 1 of the WTO DSU (Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes) concerning the coverage and 
application of the DSU,36 and Article 7 of the WTO DSU regarding 
terms of reference for the WTO panel.37 This condition is further 
emphasized by Article 2338 and the Appendix 1 of the DSU.39  
  
 35. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, art. 1, 7, 23 and Appendix 1 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 36. Id. art. 1.1 (“The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to 
disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the 
agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding 
as the ‘covered agreements’).  The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall also 
apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes between Members concerning their 
rights and obligations under the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization (referred to in this Understanding as the ‘WTO Agreement’) and of 
this Understanding taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered 
agreement.”). 
 37. See id. art. 7.1, 7.2 (“Panels shall have the following terms of reference 
unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise within 20 days from the establishment of 
the panel: ‘To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered 
agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name 
of party) in document . . . and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s).’ Panels 
shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the 
parties to the dispute.”). 
 38. See id. art. 23 (“When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations 
or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an 
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have 
recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”). 
 39. See id. Appendix 1: 
(A) Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
(B)  Multilateral Trade Agreements 
Annex 1A:  Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods 
Annex 1B:  General Agreement on Trade in Services 
Annex 1C:   Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 
Annex 2:   Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes 
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Because there are no forum choice clauses in the WTO legal texts, the 
WTO DSB strongly upheld its jurisdictions although the same disputes 
had already been settled in the forums of RTAs. This is evidenced by the 
practical cases of jurisdictional conflicts as mentioned in Section I(A) of 
this article. However, tribunals under the RTAs’ DSMs will not receive 
the case again when those cases are already settled by the WTO DSB. 
The reason is that such re-litigations under the RTAs’ DSMs will violate 
their own forum choice clauses. Their exclusive forum choice clauses do 
not permit the action of re-litigations. Unfortunately, there are no rules 
under the WTO system to deal with jurisdictional conflicts between the 
WTO and RTAs.40 Therefore, the main causation for jurisdictional 
conflicts between the WTO and RTAs is the lack of forum choice clause 
in the WTO legal texts. 
B. The Fundamental Method  
Because the WTO lacks effective pertinent rules to resolve its 
jurisdictional conflicts with RTAs, many argue that general principles of 
international law concerning the matter of jurisdictional conflicts seem to 
be the most suitable solution.41 These principles include res judicata 
principle, comity principle, and forum non conveniens principle. Indeed, 
the WTO DSB is able to utilize the general principles of international 
  
(C)  Plurilateral Trade Agreements 
Annex 4:   
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft 
Agreement on Government Procurement 
International Dairy Agreement 
International Bovine Meat Agreement 
The applicability of this Understanding to the Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements shall be subject to the adoption of a decision by the 
parties to each agreement setting out the terms for the application 
of the Understanding to the individual agreement, including any 
special or additional rules or procedures for inclusion in 
Appendix 2, as notified to the DSB). 
 40. See notes 35-39. 
 41. See note 29. 
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law as the complement of its legal texts to settle its jurisdictional 
conflicts with RTAs.42 As mentioned in Section I(B), whether to apply 
those general principles is in the discretion of the WTO DSB.43 It is not a 
compulsory obligation in the WTO legal text. Therefore, it is possible 
that the WTO DSB refuses to apply these general principles of 
international law.  
In order to fundamentally resolve jurisdictional conflicts between the 
WTO and RTAs, the WTO should fully realize the binding effect of 
sources of international law. Consequently, the WTO should amend its 
legal texts to pay more attention to the post-formative “operation” of 
RTAs under the WTO and not just the “formation” stage.44 According to 
the perception of this article, the amendment of the WTO legal texts to 
offer WTO panels or its Appellate Body a forum choice clause in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings is the fundamental method to settle 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs. The following 
analysis will prove why this amendment is the fundamental method.  
1. The Equal Hierarchy between RTAs’ agreements and 
WTO legal texts 
Theoretically, there is no formal “hierarchy of sources” in current 
international law.45 There is no uniform hierarchy among different 
sources of international law, which allows various international tribunals 
to apply those different sources of international law, formally and legally 
speaking, in “clinical isolation.”46 Currently, the sources of international 
law reveal a variety of kinds of fragmentation. This fragmentation is 
reflected from “the lack of centralized organs, specialization of law, 
different structures of legal norms, parallel regulations, competitive 
  
 42. See Yang, supra note 21, at 305. 
 43. See note 29. 
 44. See Cho, supra note 5, at 452; see also Hafez, supra note 5. 
 45. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW 
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2003) [hereinafter 
CONFLICT OF NORMS]. 
 46. See Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law—Praises 
for the Prohibition Against ‘Clinical Isolation’ in WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD 
TRADE 87, 115-52 (1999). 
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regulations, an enlargement of the scope of international law, and 
different regimes of secondary rules.”47  
Some may argue that the Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists the 
hierarchy of different sources of international laws and is able to regulate 
conflicts of legal norms at the international level; however, many 
scholars oppose this.48 The traditional sources of international law, 
treaty, customary law and general principles of law, listed in Paragraphs 
1(a) to (c) of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute,49 are not considered to have 
established any a priori hierarchy.50 Brownlie points out that sources in 
Article 38 “are not stated to represent a hierarchy, but the draftsmen 
intended to give an order and in one draft the word ‘successively’ 
appeared.”51 The order of sources in Article 38 just shows the logical 
  
 47. Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to Combat The Fragmentation 
of International law: Has The ILC Missed An Opportunity?, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
259, 262-63 (2007). 
 48. CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45; Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchy of the 
Sources of International Law, in 47 (1) BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INT’L L. 1974-1975, at 
273, 274. 
 49. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 (1946): 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.  
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to 
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.”). 
Id. 
 50. See id.; see also Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 
100 AM. J. INT’L L., 291, 291 (2006). 
 51. John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of A Treaty and Rationalist 
International Relations Theory: the Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of 
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sequences of the appearance of these sources in the judge’s mind and 
Article 38 would not hope to set up a certain hierarchy for these sources 
in the international arena.52   
The basic reason for no formal hierarchy among sources of 
international law is that “[i]nternational law, unlike domestic legal 
system[s], is ‘decentralized’ in that it has no central legislator creating 
the rules” and “the prime creators of international law are also the main 
subjects of international law, namely, states.”53 The international society 
must respect the intention of states. Indeed, “international law is a law of 
co-operation, not subordination,” and as “all norms essentially derive 
from the same source (state consent), it is presumed that they have the 
same binding value.”54 All states are in equal status and it is hard to 
conclude that agreements among RTA members have less binding value 
effect than WTO legal texts. They are all agreements of states and should 
be equal respected.  
Therefore, forum choice clauses of RTAs and the jurisdictional clause 
of the WTO are in the same hierarchy, it is hard to judge which one owns 
the priority when they conflict with each other. There is no “all-
encompassing umbrella jurisdiction” to deal with the growth of 
international judiciary.55 The only rule under this circumstance is the 
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) principle.56 It means that 
the WTO DSB should obey its own legal texts and tribunals under RTAs 
should also follow their own treaty obligation. Faced with this kind of 
difficulty, it is better to apply a forum choice clause in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. Then the WTO DSB is able to justify which 
jurisdiction, either that of the WTO or the RTA, owns priority when 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs happen. 
  
Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, in 83 VIRGINIA LAW Review 1, n. 203 
(1997). 
 52. Akehurst, supra note 48. 
 53. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 95. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Leathley, supra note 34, at 267. 
 56. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 327. 
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2. Preference for Treaties 
Although there is no hierarchy existing among different sources of 
international law theoretically, “in operational terms, a certain hierarchy 
between the sources can be detected—treaties normally prevailing over 
custom which should, in turn, prevail over general principles of law—
this hierarchy cannot be generali[s]ed.”57 The opinions supporting the 
existence of a practical hierarchy in international law are increasing 
recently.58 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ does not clearly elevate 
the hierarchy of different sources of international laws, but it does 
provide a quasi-hierarchical list and considers treaty preference in its list 
order.59  
From the practical aspect, the Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ 
shows the different functions of those sources in international judges or 
arbitrators’ minds although there is no hierarchy among them in 
theoretical aspects. International tribunals prefer treaties, such as 
multilateral agreements, because treaties clearly reflect the agreement of 
their member states and precisely define their rights and obligations.60 
For instance, the ICJ prefers to depend on “a practice clearly established 
between two States, which was accepted by the Parties as governing the 
relations between them” and “attribute decisive effect to” it in order to 
justify the specific rights and obligations between these states.61 
General principles of international law are usually a secondary source 
of international law except those belonging to jus cogens.62 The intended 
  
 57. See id. at 147. 
 58. See, e.g., Joseph Weiler & Andreas Paulus, The Structure of Change in 
International Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?, 8 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 545 (1997). 
 59. Juliana Murray, Assessing Allegations: Judicial Evaluation of Testimonial 
Evidence in International Tribunals, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 769, 771 (2010). 
 60. John McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and 
Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 229, 239  
(2003).  
 61. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 44, 233 
(Apr. 12). 
 62. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 393-94 (1953). 
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functions for general principles of law are mainly “filling gaps left open 
by treaty and custom with the objective of avoiding a non liquet.”63 
Compared with customs and general principles of law, the content of 
treaties is less uncertain and more easily applied by the international 
tribunals. The WTO legal text is the convention of all its member states 
and it is the treaty in nature. The WTO panel or Appellate Body will 
prefer to justify the dispute before it based on the WTO legal texts.  
Consequently, the amendment of the WTO legal texts, which offers 
WTO panels or its Appellate Body a forum choice clause in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings, is highly recommended in this article. It 
is considered by this article as a fundamental method to resolve 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs. This method 
ensures that the forum choice clause becomes the legal basis of 
settlement of jurisdiction conflicts between the WTO and RTAs. 
However, whether to apply pertinent general principle of international 
law to settle these jurisdictional conflicts is the discretion of the WTO 
DSB. 
C. The Precondition for Applying Forum Choice Clause in WTO 
Dispute Settlement Proceedings 
According to the analysis below, there are two ways to offer the WTO 
panel or its Appellate Body a forum choice clause in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. One method is to offer the WTO DSB legal basis 
to apply RTAs’ forum choice clauses. The other is to stipulate a forum 
choice clause in the WTO legal texts. These two methods will be 
discussed in detail in the section 3 and section 4 respectively and not be 
analyzed here. The emphasis here is the precondition for applying forum 
choice clauses in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. The precondition 
focuses on how to define the “same dispute” involved in the cases of 
overlapping jurisdictions. It is the “same dispute” that brings about the 
issue of overlapping jurisdictions and the forum choice clause is 
designed to avoid initiating different dispute settlement proceedings 
regarding the “same dispute.” 
  
 63. CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 129. 
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There are some debates concerning the “same dispute” if disputes are 
claimed under different arbitral tribunals.64 Traditionally, claims 
triggered under different agreements constitute different grounds. 
However, it should be noticed that such different grounds may be 
artificial when those grounds refer to the same legal obligation.65 In the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea) tribunal stated:  
[T]he Parties to this dispute … [wer]e the same Parties grappling not 
with two separate disputes but with what in fact [wa]s a single dispute 
arising under both Conventions. To find that, in this case, there [wa]s a 
dispute actually arising under UNCLOS which [wa]s distinct from the 
dispute that arose under the CCSBT would be artificial.66 
Currently, many scholars and experts prefer the method that examines 
the underlying nature of a dispute but not just its formal classification.67 
This fulfills the practical situation in international society. Different 
international tribunals have their respective agreements towards the same 
dispute, such as the fact that many RTAs have rules about national 
treatment. If claims under different agreements constitute different 
disputes, the forum choice clauses of RTAs will become meaningless.  
For example, US-Israel FTA (Free Trade Agreement) states that if the 
dispute settlement panel under the agreement or any other international 
dispute settlement mechanism is invoked with respect to any matter, the 
mechanism shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that matter.68 The 
matter mentioned in the forum choice clause of US-Israel FTA obviously 
refers to the issue between the same disputing parties regarding their 
same benefit involved. Although the same disputing parties will pursue 
  
 64. FRANÇOIS-XAVIER TRAIN, LES CONTRATS LIÉS DEVANT L’ARBITRE DU 
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 458-60, 470 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2003). 
 65. INTERIM REPORT: “RES JUDICATA” AND ARBITRATION 20 (2004), available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/19 [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. 
 66. Southern Bluefin Tuna (Austl. and N.Z. v. Japan), Award of Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶ 54 (Aug. 4, 2000), available at  
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/1-57.pdf.  
 67. August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis Pendens as 
Procedural Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes, 3 LAW PRAC. INT’L 
CTS. & TRIB. 37, 71 (2004). 
 68. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Isr., Aug. 19, 1985.  
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relief concerning the same issue under different dispute settlement 
forums, it does not mean that these disputes in different forums are not 
the same ‘matter’ as mentioned in the forum choice clause of US-Israel 
FTA. 
The same dispute could be expansively interpreted that “a similar 
situation exists between identical parties in relation to related legal 
relationships.”69 Many bilateral and multilateral courts or tribunals have 
already adopted the method that examines the underlying nature of a 
dispute but not merely its formal classification. For instance, the 
judgment in the Genocide case softened the three triple identity test for 
res judicata by concluding the res judicata effect of the judgment based 
on the Genocide Convention although the new dispute depended on 
different grounds.70 Form current international practices, the forum 
choice clause is effective “when a claimant brings claims against the 
same respondent arising out of the same factual situation before 
different” international dispute settlement forums.71  
III. THE APPLICATION OF RTAS’ FORUM CHOICE CLAUSES IN WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
According to the former analysis, the better measure to resolve 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs is to offer a forum 
choice clause in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Many RTAs have 
already stipulated forum choice clauses, which could fill the void aspect 
of the WTO rules on jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs. Therefore, one method is to amend the WTO legal texts as to 
allow the WTO DSB to apply RTAs’ forum choice clauses. Some 
scholars support this argument that the best solution for jurisdictional 
conflicts between international courts or tribunals is to apply the explicit 
forum choice clause of disputants themselves, such as those already 
stipulated in RTAs.72 Indeed, many RTAs already have rules concerning 
  
 69. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 65, at 3-4. 
 70. See Stephen Wittich, Permissible Derogation from Mandatory Rules? The 
Problem of Party Status in the Genocide Case, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 591, 604-05 (2007). 
 71. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 65, at 4. 
 72. See Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 13, at 91.  
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jurisdictional conflicts although there still are none in the legal texts of 
WTO. If the WTO DSB is able to apply the forum choice clauses in 
RTAs, the problem of jurisdictional conflicts will be easily resolved.  
A. The Advantage and Challenge to Apply RTAs’ Forum Choice 
Clauses in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings 
1. The Advantage 
If the WTO panel or Appellate Body is not able to utilize the forum 
choice clauses in RTAs, the problem comes just as the US—Tuna II case 
between the US and Mexico. “On 9 March 2009, Mexico requested the 
establishment of a [WTO] panel” with respect to certain measures taken 
by the United States concerning the importation, marketing and sale of 
tuna and tuna products.73 The DSB established a panel on April 20, 2009. 
On November 5, 2009, “the United States ha[d] requested  [NAFTA] 
dispute settlement consultations with Mexico regarding Mexico’s failure 
to move its ‘dolphin safe’ labeling dispute from the [WTO] to the 
NAFTA, as requested by the United States and as required by Article 
2005 of the NAFTA.”74 According to the perception of the United States, 
“dolphin safe” labeling dispute related to the “protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment.”75 Consequently, this 
dispute should be settled exclusively in the DSM of the NAFTA as 
provided under the Article 2005.4 of the NAFTA.76 
  
 73. WT/DS381/R, supra note 8. 
 74. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United 
States Initiates NAFTA Dispute with Mexico over Mexico’s Failure to Move Its Tuna-
Dolphin Dispute from the WTO to the NAFTA (Nov. 2009), available at  
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/november/united-states-
initiates-nafta-dispute-mexico-over. 
 75. WT/DS381/R, supra note 8. 
 76. See U.S.-Isr. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 68, 4(a) (“In any dispute 
referred to in paragraph 1 that arises under Section B of Chapter Seven (Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures) or Chapter Nine (Standards-Related Measures):  (a) concerning 
a measure adopted or maintained by a Party to protect its human, animal or plant life or 
health, or to protect its environment[] . . . where the responding Party requests in writing 
that the matter be considered under this Agreement, the complaining Party may, in 
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However, Mexico failed to either take any steps to appoint a dispute 
panel in the NAFTA DSM or agree to move the WTO case to the 
NAFTA. The United States also did not invoke exclusive forum choice 
clause enshrined in Article 2005.4 of the NAFTA to ask the WTO panel 
or Appellate Body to decline proceeding to the merits. Both the WTO 
panel and Appellate Body in this case did not consider the issue of 
overlapping jurisdictions and their reports were circulated to Members.77 
This dispute was finally settled by the agreement between the United 
States and Mexico that “the reasonable period of time for the United 
States to implement the DSB recommendations and rulings shall be 13 
months.”78 
Unlike the argument of Argentina in the Argentina—Poultry case, the 
United States did not insist the Article 2005.4 of the NAFTA as a 
possible defense during the WTO dispute settlement proceeding. In the 
Argentina—Poultry case, Argentina, of course, opposed the WTO 
Panel’s exercise of jurisdiction in its preliminary argument and requested 
that “in light of the prior MERCOSUR proceedings, the Panel refrain[ed] 
from ruling on the claims raised by Brazil in the present WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings.”79 “[T]he MERCOSUR Protocol of Olivos . . . 
allow[ed] MERCOSUR members to choose the forum in which they 
wish disputes to be settled, with the restriction constituted by the 
exclusion clause . . . once a procedure ha[d] been initiated in one forum, 
this precludes resorting to other forums provided [for] in the Protocol.”80  
Therefore, the attitude of the WTO panel or Appellate Body towards 
forum choice clauses of RTAs is not revealed in the recent US—Tuna II 
case. The strong attitude of the WTO DSB towards its own jurisdiction, 
reflect in the Mexico—Soft Drink case, the Argentina—Poultry case, is 
not changed and will attenuate the effect of forum choice clauses under 
  
respect of that matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely 
under this Agreement.”). 
 77. See generally WT/DS381/R, supra note 8; see also Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012).  
 78. DISPUTE DS381, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm. 
 79. WT/DS241/R, supra note 10, at ¶ 7.17. 
 80. Id. ¶ 7.29.   
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RTAs’ DSMs when jurisdictional conflicts occur. The Appellate Body in 
the Mexico—Soft Drink case was of the opinion that settling an 
established dispute under its jurisdiction is part of the panel’s obligations 
according to the relevant provisions of the DSU.81 A disputant who 
triggers a procedure under the WTO DSB has the right to be “entitled to 
a ruling by a WTO panel.”82  In the Argentina—Poultry case, the WTO 
Panel held that “there [was] no basis for a WTO panel to apply the 
principle of estoppel.”83 
If the amendment of the WTO legal texts adds a new clause to allow 
the WTO panel or Appellate Body to apply forum choice clauses of 
RTAs, the current dilemma of the WTO panel or Appellate Body 
regarding overlapping jurisdictions between the WTO and RTAs will be 
avoid. This new clause will “justify the Panel declining to exercise its 
jurisdiction” in the case of overlapping jurisdictions.84 According to the 
new clause, the WTO panel or Appellate Body will not endow its judicial 
body with full jurisdiction on matters raised in its covered agreements.85 
The DSM of a particular RTA will be the possible dispute settlement 
forum if the WTO panel or Appellate body justify the jurisdiction of that 
RTA based on the new clause in the WTO legal texts. The WTO panel or 
Appellate Body will consider the issue of overlapping jurisdictions on 
this new clause because the issue of overlapping jurisdictions falls into 
the category stipulated by this new clause and both this new clause and 
the current DSU are the WTO legal texts. 
2. The Challenge 
However, the utilization of RTAs’ forum choice clauses by the WTO 
DSB will be challenged by the argument that the jurisdiction of the WTO 
is textually limited to disputes arising from WTO covered agreements.86 
  
 81. See WT/DS308/AB/R, supra note 9, at 17-18, 19-21. 
 82. See id. ¶ 52. 
 83. See WT/DS241/R, supra note 10, at 21 n.58.  
 84. See WT/DS308/AB/R, supra note 9, at ¶ 4.   
 85. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. II, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 86. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the 
WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535 (2001).  
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This argument is reflected from the WTO DSB practice in the India—
Patents case that “[a]lthough panels enjoy some discretion in 
establishing their own working procedures, this discretion does not 
extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the DSU . . . . Nothing 
in the DSU gives a panel the authority either to disregard or to modify . . 
. explicit provisions of the DSU.”87 
It seems that a WTO panel or its Appellate Body is not able to decide 
a particular case based on the substantive stipulation of RTAs, such as 
their forum choice clauses. The Some scholars also consider that the 
jurisdiction of the WTO DSB is limited to the covered agreement under 
the WTO.88 Although there are critiques about the application of RTAs’ 
forum choice clauses in WTO dispute settlement proceeding, the article 
holds the perception that these critiques will not become the obstacle to 
the amendment of the WTO legal texts proposed in this article. The 
detailed reason is analyzed as following. 
Firstly, “the fact that the substantive jurisdiction of WTO panels is 
limited to claims under WTO covered agreements does not mean that the 
applicable law available to a WTO panel is necessarily limited to WTO 
covered agreements.”89 In Pauwelyn’s view, it is better to distinguish the 
legal basis of disputes from the law applied to settle disputes.90 He 
further points out that “DSU Arts. 3.2 and 19.2 do not address the 
jurisdiction of panels nor the applicable law that a panel can apply to a 
particular dispute” and these articles do not “proclaim that WTO covered 
agreements must necessarily and always prevail over all past and future 
law.”91 The stipulations of the WTO do not prohibit its panels or 
Appellate Body from applying non-WTO rule to settle disputes. The last 
sentence of Article 3.2 of the DSU92 indicates that it merely deals with 
  
 87. Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 92, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter 
WT/DS50/AB/R].   
 88. Joel B. Trachtman, Book Review: Conflict of Norms in Public International 
Law by Joost Pauwelyn, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 855, 858 (2004).    
 89. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, 460. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 353. 
 92. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, supra note 35, at art. 3.2 (“The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a 
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the interpretative function of panels, not with the applicable law before a 
panel, nor with conflict of norms.93 These articles do not mean that WTO 
panels and its Appellate Body are unable to resolve their dispute based 
on non-WTO rules, which are beneficial to the problem solving.  
Then, the WTO Appellate Body itself also notice that “[p]anels are 
inhibited from addressing legal claims falling outside their terms of 
reference,” but “nothing in the DSU limits the faculty of a Panel freely to 
use arguments submitted by any of the parties—or to develop its own 
legal reasoning—to support its own findings and conclusions on the 
matter under its consideration.”94 This article holds the same perception 
that WTO panels have extensive discretion powers to apply arguments of 
disputing parties, especially when there are unclear or no pertinent rules 
about disputing matters in the WTO legal texts.95 Accordingly, forum 
choice clauses of RTAs can be utilized to support the findings and 
conclusions of the WTO panel or Appellate Body if these clauses are 
“submitted by any of the parties.”96  
Practically, Argentina submitted the forum choice clause under 
Protocol of Olivos as its argument in the Argentina—Poultry case.97 The 
WTO Panel in this case indeed considered the argument of Argentina 
and did not ignore the validity of the forum choice clause of the 
MERCOSUR.98 However, the WTO Panel did not rely on this forum 
choice clause to assess the case because this forum choice clause had 
“not yet entered into force” when this dispute happened.99 According to 
  
central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. 
The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members 
under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements.”). 
 93. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 353. 
 94. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), ¶ 156, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
 95. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. II, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See WT/DS241/R, supra note 10, at ¶ 7.37.   
 98. WT/DS241/R, supra, note 10. 
 99. See id. ¶ 7.38. 
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the attitude of the WTO Panel in this case, forum choice clauses of RTAs 
will possibly be utilized to settle the issue of overlapping jurisdictions by 
WTO panels if they have already entered into force. 
Finally, the jurisdictions of WTO panels or its Appellate Body are not 
influenced when WTO panels and its Appellate Body refuse to settle a 
dispute based on forum choice clauses of RTAs. Under this 
circumstance, it only means that WTO panels and its Appellate Body do 
not directly make a finding on the merits of disputes by themselves. In 
fact, the WTO panel or its Appellate Body can rely on the decisions of 
RTAs’ DSMs to “make an objective assessment of the matter before 
it.”100 If WTO panels and its Appellate Body satisfy the decisions of 
RTAs’ DSM, they can accept those decisions. If tribunals of RTAs do not 
settle the disputes or the WTO panels and its Appellate Body consider 
the awards of RTAs’ tribunals to be contrary to the WTO legal texts, the 
disputes can still be resolved by the WTO DSB. Therefore, WTO panels 
and its Appellate Body are not deprived of its jurisdiction, and they 
actually have already exercised their jurisdictions as mentioned above 
although they abstain from “making any finding on the matter” before 
them.101 
Generally speaking, the WTO panel or Appellate Body does not 
“disregard or to modify … explicit provisions of the DSU”102 when 
WTO panel or the Appellate Body refuses to settle a dispute based on 
forum choice clauses of RTAs. Under this circumstance, the WTO panel 
or the Appellate Body does not give up its jurisdiction as stipulated in the 
DSU. Hence, the proposal to allow the WTO panel or Appellate Body to 
apply RTAs’ forum choice clauses does not violate the DSU. 
B. The Legal Bases for Applying Forum Choice Clauses of RTAs 
in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings 
The above section, Section III(A)(2), has proved that the applicable 
law is not necessarily limited to the WTO legal texts when the WTO 
  
 100. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, supra note 35, at art. 2.1. 
 101. See WT/DS308/AB/R, supra note 9, at ¶ 51.   
 102. WT/DS50/AB/R, supra note 87, at ¶ 92.    
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DSB settles its jurisdictional conflicts with RTAs. The DSU is not 
violated when WTO panel or Appellate Body applies RTAs’ forum 
choice clauses to settle jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs. This section will further analyze the legal bases to apply forum 
choice clauses of RTAs in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. 
1. Lex Posterior  
The lex posterior principle is one of the legal bases to apply forum 
choice clauses of RTAs in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Article 
30.3 and 30.4 of the VCLT (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) 
has established the lex posterior principle to resolve conflict of 
treaties.103 Article 30.3 and 30.4 of the VCLT points out that: 
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later 
treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation 
under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its 
provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.  
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to 
the earlier one:  
(a) As between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in 
paragraph 3;  
(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only 
one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs 
their mutual rights and obligations.104 
Article 30.3 and 30.4 are effective when the Article 41105 of the VCLT 
is not violated.  
  
 103. See generally Claude Chase, Norm Conflict Between WTO Covered 
Agreements—Real, Apparent or Avoided?, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 791 (2012); see also 
Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political Debate 
on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615, 629 (2009); see 
also CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 361.   
 104. Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, art. 30.3, 30.4, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
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Some RTAs are concluded after member states of these RTAs become 
WTO members. Under this circumstance, the RTAs, including their 
forum choice clauses, have priority over the WTO legal texts according 
to the lex posterior principle. For instance, the DSM of the ACFTA 
stipulates its forum choice clauses after the member states of the DSM of 
the ACFTA become WTO members.106 Its forum choice clause therefore 
fulfills the first condition for applying Article 30.3 and 30.4 of the 
VCLT, that the conflicting treaties are successive in time. The WTO 
legal texts are earlier treaties and these RTAs’ forum choice clauses are 
the later treaties within the meaning of the Article 30.3 and 30.4 of the 
VCLT.  
Then, the forum choice clauses of RTAs and the jurisdiction clauses 
of the WTO relate to the same subject matter, which is the necessary 
requirement for the application of the lex posterior principle. RTA’s 
forum clauses and pertinent Articles of the DSU, its Article 1, 3.2 and 
7.3, all concern the same subject-matter, that the jurisdiction towards a 
particular dispute. The same subject matter is the precondition for the 
  
 105. See id. art. 41. 
1. Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may 
conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between 
themselves alone if:  
(a) The possibility of such a modification is provided for by the 
treaty; or  
(b) The modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty 
and:  
(i) Does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their 
rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations;  
(ii) Does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and 
purpose of the treaty as a whole.  
2. Unless in a case falling under paragraph 1 (a) the treaty 
otherwise provides, the parties in question shall notify the other 
parties of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the 
modification to the treaty for which it provides. 
 106. See Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Fraemwork 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Operation Between the Association of Southest 
Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China, art. 1.1. 
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effective Article 30.3 and 30.4 of the VCLT.107 The WTO Panel in 
India—Autos case accepted this necessary requirement.108  
Furthermore, forum choice clauses involved in the RTAs are also 
permitted by the Article XXIV of GATT 1994. Those 379 RTAs109 in 
force under the WTO fulfill the requirement of the Article XXIV of 
GATT 1994 if their clauses are not claimed to be violated and accepted 
by the CRTA (Committee on Regional Trade Agreements).110 The 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 allows for the existence of those RTAs 
which focus on trade creation,111 minimize trade diversion,112 and involve 
substantially all trade activities among their members.113 The Article 
XXIV of GATT 1994 and its Understanding provide the standard for 
judging whether RTAs are legally established.  
If the establishment of a particular RTA is compliant with the Article 
XXIV of GATT 1994 and its Understanding, the forum choice clause 
involved into the legal text of that RTA will not be prohibited by the 
WTO. It means that the RTA’s forum choice clause is “provided for” or 
“not prohibited” by the WTO legal texts and not “incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose” of GATT 1994 as required 
in the Article 41 of the VCLT.114 In order to enforce the RTA norms, 
members of a WTO-comparable RTA would be justified in utilizing the 
RTA’s dispute settlement mechanism, including its forum choice clause. 
  
 107. See VCLT, supra note 104, at art. 30.1 (“1. Subject to Article 103 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States Parties to successive 
treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with the 
following paragraphs.”). 
 108. See Appellate Body Report, India—Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Sector, ¶ 9, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Mar. 19, 2002). 
 109. Regional trade agreements, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited June 5, 2013). 
 110. Work of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm (last visited 
June 5, 2013) (“[CRTAs] two principal duties are to examine individual regional 
agreements; and to consider [their] systemic implications . . . .”). 
 111. JOHN JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 601 (1969).  
 112. JAMES MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT-WTO: ARTICLE 
XXIV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT 2-3 (2002).  
 113. See id. at 45. 
 114. See VCLT, supra note 104, at art. 41. 
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Of course, the RTAs’ forum choice clauses only refer to the rights or 
obligations of disputing parties concerning their choice of forums. These 
forum choice clauses will not “affect the enjoyment by the other parties 
of their rights” or “the performance of their obligation” under the WTO 
legal texts.115  
2. Lex Specialis 
The application of the lex specialis principle in international law is 
supported by many scholars, litigators and international tribunals.116 
According to the statement of Pauwelyn, the lex specialis principle 
means that “the more special norm prevails over the more general norm” 
especially when lex posterior “do not find application, or are unable to 
resolve the conflict of norms.”117 Indeed, the lex posterior principle is not 
effective when RTAs are concluded before the formation of the WTO. 
For instance, the NAFTA was established in 1992118 while the WTO was 
established in 1994.119 Therefore, the forum choice clause of the NAFTA 
is not the later treaties but the earlier treaties compared with the WTO 
legal texts. Under this circumstance, the lex specialis principle becomes 
the legal basis to apply the forum choice clause of the NAFTA in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings.  
The WTO legal texts also recognize the lex specialis principle. The 
lex specialis principle could be reflected from the general interpretative 
note to Annex 1A, which states:  
In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in 
Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (referred to in the agreements in Annex 1A as the “WTO 
  
 115. See id. 
 116. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 385. 
 117. See id. 
 118. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 119. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. II, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
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Agreement”), the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the 
extent of the conflict.120 
This clause reveals that the member states of the WTO prefer to rely 
on the most close, detailed and precise expression of state consent to 
govern their relationship. The agreements in Annex 1 A are more special 
than GATT 1994 regarding the subject matter they govern. For instance, 
Agreement on Agriculture121 more effectively and precisely stipulates the 
agricultural trading system, including its terms, commitment of member 
states and so on, compared with GATT 1994. Then, the WTO allows the 
priority of the Agreement on Agriculture over GATT 1994. This could 
be proved by the Paragraph 1 of Article 21 of Agreement on Agriculture, 
which stipulates that “[t]he provisions of GATT 1994 and of other 
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement 
shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.”122  
From the practical experience, the WTO Appellate Body in the EC-
Bananas case also supports the lex specialis principle:  
Although Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the 
Licensing Agreement both apply, the Panel, in our view, should have 
applied the Licensing Agreement first, since this agreement deals 
specifically, and in detail, with the administration of import licensing 
procedures. If the Panel had done so, then there would have been no 
need for it to address the alleged inconsistency with Article X:3(a) of 
the GATT 1994.123 
  
 120. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 121. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.  
 122. See id. art. 21. 
 123. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for The 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 204, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). 
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In the EC—Hormones case, the WTO Panel also held the perception 
that the SPS Agreement should be examined firstly, compared with 
GATT.124 
According to the lex specialis principle, some forum choice clauses of 
RTAs are more special than the jurisdiction clause under the WTO DSU 
because forum choice clauses of RTAs are more specific regulations 
regarding the choice of an appropriate jurisdiction. They, such as the 
forum choice clause in the NAFTA,125 directly and precisely address the 
  
 124. Panel Report, European Communities Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, ¶ 8.45, WT/DS26/R (Aug. 18, 1997). 
 125. See NAFTA, supra note 118, at art. 2005. 
1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any matter 
arising under both this Agreement and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, any agreement negotiated there under, or any 
successor agreement (GATT), may be settled in either forum at 
the discretion of the complaining Party. 
2. Before a Party initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in the 
GATT against another Party on grounds that are substantially 
equivalent to those available to that Party under this Agreement, 
that Party shall notify any third Party of its intention. If a third 
Party wishes to have recourse to dispute settlement procedures 
under this Agreement regarding the matter, it shall inform 
promptly the notifying Party and those Parties shall consult with 
a view to agreement on a single forum. If those Parties cannot 
agree, the dispute normally shall be settled under this Agreement. 
3. In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 where the responding 
Party claims that its action is subject to Article 104 (Relation to 
Environmental and Conservation Agreements) and requests in 
writing that the matter be considered under this Agreement, the 
complaining Party may, in respect of that matter, thereafter have 
recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under this 
Agreement.  
4. In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 that arises under 
Section B of Chapter Seven (Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures) or Chapter Nine (Standards-Related Measures):  
(a) concerning a measure adopted or maintained by a Party to 
protect its human, animal or plant life or health, or to protect its 
environment, and  
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rule about how to settle overlapping disputes. However, the rule 
regarding overlapping jurisdictions is uncertain in the WTO DSU. The 
forum choice clauses of RTAs reflect the most close, detailed and precise 
expression of state consent regarding the issue of jurisdictional conflicts. 
This contractual freedom of states is also permitted by the Article XXIV 
of GATT 1994 as mentioned in the former part concerning the lex 
posterior principle. 
According to the Article 1.2 of the DSU, the lex specialis principle is 
accepted during WTO dispute settlement proceedings.126 However, the 
  
(b) that raises factual issues concerning the environment, health, 
safety or conservation, including directly related scientific 
matters, where the responding Party requests in writing that the 
matter be considered under this Agreement, the complaining 
Party may, in respect of that matter, thereafter have recourse to 
dispute settlement procedures solely under this Agreement.  
5. The responding Party shall deliver a copy of a request made 
pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 to the other Parties and to its Section 
of the Secretariat. Where the complaining Party has initiated 
dispute settlement proceedings regarding any matter subject to 
paragraph 3 or 4, the responding Party shall deliver its request no 
later than 15 days thereafter. On receipt of such request, the 
complaining Party shall promptly withdraw from participation in 
those proceedings and may initiate dispute settlement procedures 
under Article 2007.  
6. Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under 
Article 2007 or dispute settlement proceedings have been 
initiated under the GATT, the forum selected shall be used to the 
exclusion of the other, unless a Party makes a request pursuant to 
paragraph 3 or 4.  
7. For purposes of this Article, dispute settlement proceedings 
under the GATT are deemed to be initiated by a Party’s request 
for a panel, such as under Article XXIII:2 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 , or for a committee 
investigation, such as under Article 20.1 of the Customs 
Valuation Code.). 
Id. 
 126. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, supra note 35, at art. 1.2 (“2. The rules and procedures of this Understanding 
shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute 
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lex specialis principle involved in the Article 1.2 of the DSU only refers 
to conflicts of norms within the WTO legal texts. It does not mention the 
applicable law issue between the WTO legal texts and legal texts of other 
international organizations. In order to judge whether the lex specialis 
principle could be the legal basis to apply forum choice clause of RTAs 
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, it is better to analyze other 
WTO rules regarding the relationship between the WTO legal texts and 
other international laws. 
The Article XXI (c) of GATT 1994 supports the priority of UN 
Charter concerning the “maintenance of international peace and 
security.”127 The Article 11.3 of Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) even stipulates 
the rights of WTO member states “to resort to the good offices or dispute 
settlement mechanisms” under RTAs.128 According to the Article 11.3, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the member states of RTAs are allowed to 
settle their own disputes regarding sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
under their own RTAs. The WTO panels or Appellate Body will 
recognize the jurisdiction of RTAs to the disputes based on SPS 
Agreement. The Article 2.2 of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) also mentions that “[n]othing in Parts I to IV of 
this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members 
may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne 
  
settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this 
Understanding. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures 
of this Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in 
Appendix 2, the special or additional rules and procedures in Appendix 2 shall prevail.”). 
 127. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. XXI, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1994] (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . 
. (c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.”). 
 128. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 
11.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (“Nothing in this Agreement shall impair the rights of 
Members under other international agreements, including the right to resort to the  good 
offices or dispute settlement mechanisms of other international organizations or 
established under any international agreement.”). 
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Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”129 
Based on the analysis above, the lex specialis principle is supported 
and practiced within the WTO legal system to settle conflicts of norms 
among the WTO legal texts. Based on the lex specialis principle, the 
WTO also respects some obligations and rights of its member states in 
other international agreements. Currently, the WTO legal texts do not 
explicitly stipulate the effect of lex specialis between jurisdiction clauses 
of RTAs and the WTO jurisdiction clause. According to the attitude of 
the WTO towards the effect of lex specialis, forum choice clauses of 
RTAs permitted by the Article XXIV of GATT 1994 could be utilized by 
the WTO panel or Appellate Body based on the lex specialis principle. 
3. The Evidence of Forum Selection 
The forum choice clauses of RTAs could also be considered as the 
evidence of the appropriate dispute settlement forums chosen by 
disputing parties themselves. The effective rules of the disputing parties, 
not necessarily those in the covered agreements of tribunals, are able to 
govern the forum selection process.130 During WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings, the WTO panel or Appellate Body should consider the 
evidential effect of RTAs’ forum choice clauses if disputing parties 
present these clauses as the evidence of their choice concerning the 
dispute settlement forum. These clauses are the key evidence of the 
dispute settlement and explicitly point out the dispute settlement forum.  
Some WTO clauses reflect that the WTO will rely on the decisions 
and terms of other international organizations to assist its assessment. 
For instance, the WTO pays attention on its cooperation with the 
  
 129. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
 130. Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 102-103 (Dec. 2) 
(separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).  
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International Monetary Fund (IMF).131 WTO requires its contracting 
parties to:  
[A]ccept all findings of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund 
relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of 
payments, and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether 
action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or with 
the terms of a special exchange agreement between that contracting 
party and the CONTRACTING PARTIES.132 
The final decision of WTO contracting parties regarding the criteria of 
a serious decline in the contracting party’s monetary reserves shall accept 
the determination of the IMF.133 “Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund” shall also be respected by WTO 
members.134 
According to the analysis above, the decisions and terms of the IMF 
will assist the WTO DSB in fulfilling its obligation to “make an 
objective assessment of the matter before it”135 if there is any dispute on 
the matter of exchange, monetary reserves and balances of payments. It 
means that the decisions and terms of the IMF function as the key 
evidence of WTO disputes. Forum choice clauses of RTAs could also 
function as the evidence of the appropriate dispute settlement forums 
chosen by disputing parties themselves. These forum choice clauses are 
permitted by Article XXIV of GATT 1994, as mentioned in the Section 
III(B)(1) of this article. During WTO dispute settlement proceedings, 
  
 131. Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organization with the 
International Monetary Fund, Uruguay Round Agreements,  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/34-dimf_e.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) 
(“[U]nless otherwise provided for in the Final Act, the relationship of the WTO with the 
International Monetary Fund, with regard to the areas covered by the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, will be based on the provisions that 
have governed the relationship of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 
with the International Monetary Fund.”). 
 132. See GATT 1994, supra note 127, at art. XV, ¶ 2. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. art. XV, ¶ 7(b). 
 135. DSU, supra note 35, at art. 11. 
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they are the legal and effective evidence of the appropriate dispute 
settlement forums chosen by disputing parties themselves. These forum 
choice clauses will help the WTO panel or Appellate Body to “make an 
objective assessment” of the jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO 
and RTAs.136 
Generally speaking, the lex posterior principle and the lex sepcialis 
principle offer WTO panels and the Appellate Body legal bases to apply 
forum choice clauses of RTAs to settle jurisdictional conflicts between 
the WTO and RTAs. WTO panels and the Appellate Body can also 
consider forum choice clauses of RTAs as the effective evidence of the 
appropriate dispute settlement forums chosen by disputing parties. 
Therefore, there are enough legal bases for the WTO to apply RTAs’ 
forum choice clauses in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.137 The 
WTO is suggested to amend its legal texts by adding a new clause, which 
clearly allows WTO panels and its Appellate Body to apply the forum 
choice clause of a particular RTA to deal with the disputes only 
involving member states within that RTA when that forum choice clause 
is not forbidden by the WTO legal texts.138  
According to the history of the GATT/WTO and the Marrakesh 
Agreement, the amendment of the WTO legal texts is possible because 
the GATT/WTO needs to update its multilateral agreements to 
accommodate the new development of international law. The negotiating 
round of trade talks in GATT/WTO “occurs permitting transformation of 
the basic agreements” in nearly every decade.139 Article X of the 
Marrakesh Agreement indeed permits and offers rules for amending the 
WTO legal texts.140 For instance, WTO members agreed the first ever 
amendment to the TRIPS on 6 December 2005.141 The amendment 
specified in this article, adding a new clause to allow WTO panels and its 
  
 136. Id. 
 137. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, supra note 35. 
 138. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 120. 
 139. JOHN JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 19, at 94. 
 140. Marrakesh Agreement, supra 120. 
 141. General Council, Amendment of TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 6, 
2005). 
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Appellate Body to apply forum choice clauses of RTAs, could be 
accepted in the WTO legal texts in the forms of annex, understanding, or 
any others. 
IV. THE FORUM CHOICE CLAUSE IN THE WTO LEGAL TEXTS 
As mentioned in the former section, the application of RTAs’ forum 
choice clauses in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is one way for the 
WTO to resolve its jurisdiction conflicts with RTAs. The other is the 
measure discussed here, stipulating a forum choice clause in the WTO 
legal texts. The WTO is advised to explicitly stipulate a forum choice 
clause to settle jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs. 
A. The Incentive to Stipulate A Forum Choice Clause in the WTO 
Legal Texts 
One incentive to stipulate a forum choice clause in the WTO legal 
texts is that increasingly serious jurisdictional conflicts between the 
WTO and RTAs are hard to settle currently. This matter has been 
discussed in the Section I of this article and will not be repeated. As 
mentioned in Section II(A) of this article, many RTA provisions have 
already adopted forum choice clauses, which reflects the latest 
international tendency.142 This is the other incentive and the emphasis 
here. This tendency has long been supported by the principle of free 
choice of means to settle sovereign disputes. According to the analysis 
below, this tendency will gradually form the new international custom 
for the settlement of jurisdictional conflicts and then further stimulate the 
WTO to stipulate the forum choice clause in its own legal text.  
Many international scholars and practitioners have noticed a 
pronounced inflationary tendency in international law: “non law becomes 
soft law, soft law becomes hard law, and various customary and treaty 
norms become jus cogens.”143 It could be discovered from international 
  
 142. See Gao and Lim, supra note 28, at 907-08; see also Kwak and Marceau, 
supra note 17, at 6; Pauwelyn, Going Global, Regional, or Both?, supra note 17, at 287–
89. 
 143. Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, supra note 50, at 322. 
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practices that through the continuing conclusions and operations, a 
particular treaty adopted by many states “may gradually change 
customary law on the same subject matter so as to conform to the new 
treaty.”144 A treaty joined by increasing states then gradually becomes 
conclusive evidence of customary international law practices, which will 
then place the whole international community including the states not 
affirmatively accepting that treaty under the legal obligations of that 
treaty.145 Article 38 of the VCLT reveals the same reasoning that 
“nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from 
becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international, 
recognized as such.”146  
As mentioned in the Section II(A) of this article, many RTAs have 
stipulated forum choice clauses in their legal texts. Then, forum choice 
clauses have already become widespread practices of international 
organizations. Member states of these international organizations will 
apply forum choice clauses to deal with issues of jurisdictional 
conflicts.147 According to the analysis in the former paragraph, these 
international practices will gradually form a new international custom of 
resolving jurisdictional conflicts, relying on forum choice clauses. This 
new custom will influence the WTO legal texts and then stimulate the 
WTO to add a forum choice clause in its own legal texts to settle its 
jurisdictional conflicts with RTAs. Kontou strengthens this statement 
that: “[n]ew customary law may be invoked as a ground for the 
termination or revision of a prior treaty.”148 
The WTO also pays attentions to its relationship with other 
international laws. In the US—Gasoline case, the WTO Appellate Body 
considered that Article 3.2 of the DSU “reflects a measure of recognition 
that the [GATT 1994] is not to be read in clinical isolation from public 
  
 144. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 136.  
 145. BURNS WESTON, RICHARD FALK & ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 5, 76-77 (2nd ed. 1990). 
 146. See VCLT, supra note 104, at art. 38. 
 147. See, e.g., WT/DS241/R, supra note 10. 
 148. NACY KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN THE LIGHT 
OF NEW CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (1994). 
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international law.”149 Both customs and treaties represent the consent of 
individual states on a particular issue, although customs are usually 
reflected by the implied consent of all states.150 However, international 
laws are equally binding no matter whether they are created by explicit 
consent or merely by implied consent.151 A new custom owns the effect 
of lex posterior and it is the latest intentions of states on the same subject 
matter. The amendment of WTO legal texts according to a new custom 
will avoid the conflict between the WTO legal texts and a new custom, 
and let the WTO legal texts accommodate the new development of 
international law.  
As discussed at the end of the Section III(B)(3) of this article, the 
amendment of the WTO legal texts is possible. During amendment 
process in the WTO Ministerial Conference, the decision to submit a 
proposed amendment to WTO members for acceptance or to approve 
amendments usually shall be made by consensus, or at least a two-third 
majority of WTO members.152 If amendments need further acceptance 
process, amendments shall take effect upon acceptance by at least two 
thirds of WTO members.153 The majority voting mechanism for 
amending the WTO legal texts ensures that a widespread international 
practice already accepted by most WTO members will probably be 
stipulated in the WTO legal texts.  
The democratic amendment process of the WTO legal texts “allow[s] 
all governments the chance to participate and to express” their 
intentions.154 A widespread international practice means that more states 
including WTO members accept this practice. And then this practice 
more easily gets enough votes from WTO members to become the 
amendment to the WTO provisions. As mentioned in the Section II(A) of 
  
 149. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline ¶ 17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 150. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (2001). 
 151. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 96; see also BARON MCNAIR, THE 
LAW OF TREATIES 64 (1961). 
 152. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 120. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in Yoram Dinstein and Mala 
Tabory, in INT’L LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI 
ROSENNE 720 (Yoram Dinsten ed., 1998). 
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this article, many WTO members support to apply forum choice clauses 
to settle jurisdictional conflicts, which becomes a widespread 
international practice.155 Accordingly, WTO members are able to 
encourage the WTO to stipulate a forum choice clause based on this 
widespread international practice. 
B. The Advantage to Stipulate A Forum Choice Clause in the WTO 
Legal Texts 
If the WTO stipulates a forum choice clause in its legal texts, 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs will be 
fundamentally resolved. The amendment suggested in Section III of this 
article, the application of RTAs’ forum choice clauses in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings, endows WTO panels or the Appellate Body the 
right to apply forum choice clauses of RTAs. The amendment suggested 
in this section makes the application of a forum choice clause more 
directly in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. If there is a forum 
choice clause in the WTO legal texts, WTO panels or the Appellate Body 
will have to apply a forum choice clause. The reason is that this forum 
choice clause has already become the treaty obligation of WTO panels or 
the Appellate Body. 
A forum choice clause written in the WTO legal texts will be “easier 
to prove and identify.”156 The written text of treaties “brings clarity and 
precision.”157 This is the reason why most international tribunals would 
like to apply treaty laws rather than other sources of international law. 
International tribunals prefer applying treaty norms because of “the much 
greater precision and ease of determination of content and range of 
validity in the case of conventional rules and, in consequence, the much 
stronger, by comparison with other rules, persuasive impact for the Court 
and the parties.”158  
  
 155. See supra note 32. 
 156. See CONFLICT OF NORMS, supra note 45, at 134. 
 157. Schachter, supra note 154.  
 158. KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INT’L LAW 93 (Wroclawskie 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Wroclaw eds., 1964). 
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As the international tribunal, WTO panels or the Appellate Body also 
would like to depend on their own legal texts to settle disputes brought 
before them. If a forum choice clause is part of the WTO legal texts, 
WTO panels or the Appellate Body will observe such a clause and apply 
it to settle its jurisdictional conflicts with RTAs.  Jennifer agrees that:  
the best solution would be for WTO members to use the Doha 
negotiating mandate regarding RTAs to resolve the legal relationship 
between these agreements and the WTO, and to establish clear rules for 
addressing conflicts and overlaps between the dispute settlement 
mechanisms of the two.159  
According to the opinion of this article, the forum choice clause of the 
WTO is suggested to follow the model of exclusive forum clauses 
adopted in many successful RTAs. For instance, paragraph 6 of Article 
2005 of the NAFTA mentions that “[o]nce dispute settlement procedures 
have been initiated under Article 2007 or dispute settlement proceedings 
have been initiated under the GATT, the forum selected shall be used to 
the exclusion of the other.”160 Exclusive forum choice clauses are 
effective measures to settle jurisdiction conflicts between international 
tribunals and are able to clearly justify an appropriate dispute settlement 
forum when jurisdictional conflicts happen. Currently, they are also the 
popular clauses to deal with the matter of overlapping jurisdictions. 
Besides the NAFTA’s exclusive forum clause and exclusive forum 
clauses mentioned in Section II(A) of this article, other instances of these 
  
 159. Hillman, supra note 12, at 205. 
 160. NAFTA, supra note 118, at art. 2005.6. 
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clauses are in EC—Mexico free trade agreement,161 ASEAN—Korean 
free trade agreement,162 and so on.  
Following the model of exclusive forum clauses, the forum choice 
clause of the WTO is recommended to stipulate that once the dispute 
settlement proceeding under the DSU or any other dispute settlement 
mechanism of a RTA established under the Article XXIV of GATT 1994 
has been involved with respect to any dispute, the forum selected by the 
complaining party shall be used to the exclusion of any other for that 
dispute.163 Of course, there are two preconditions for the application of 
the WTO’s exclusive forum clause. One precondition is that the parties 
to that particular dispute are the same under both the WTO dispute 
settlement proceeding and the dispute settlement mechanism of that 
RTA. The other is that the parties to that particular dispute are the 
member states of both the WTO and that RTA. 
According to the proposed exclusive forum clause in the WTO legal 
texts, the situation that forum exclusion provisions of RTAs are obsolete 
in terms of preventing disputing parties from initiating other dispute 
mechanisms will be avoided. The WTO panel or Appellate Body used to 
take over the case since they consider it their right to decide matters 
within their own jurisdiction.164 In Mexico—Taxes on Soft Drinks case
  
 161. See 2001 O.J. (L 70/7) 153 (“Recourse to the dispute settlement provisions of 
this Title shall be without prejudice to any possible action in the WTO framework, 
including dispute settlement action. However, where a Party has, with regard to a 
particular matter, instituted a dispute settlement proceeding under either Article 39(1) of 
this Title or the WTO Agreement, it shall not institute a dispute settlement proceeding 
regarding the same matter under the other forum until such time as the first proceeding 
has ended.”). 
 162. See Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the 
Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of 
Korea, art. 2, ¶ 5, Dec. 13, 2005 (“Once dispute settlement proceedings have been 
initiated under this Agreement or under any other treaty to which the parties to a dispute 
are parties concerning a particular right or obligation of such Parties arising under the 
covered agreements or that other treaty, the forum selected by the complaining party shall 
be used to the exclusion of any other for such dispute.”). 
 163. See supra notes 33 and 34. 
 164. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 54, 
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000). 
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the WTO Panel was of the opinion that “under the DSU, it ha[d] no 
discretion to decide whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction in a case 
properly before it.”165 In respect of jurisdictional conflicts between the 
WTO and NAFTA, the Appellate Body then argued that “[i]t is difficult 
to see how a panel would fulfill that obligation if it declined to exercise 
validly established jurisdiction and abstained from making any finding 
on the matter before it.”166 That is the key reason why the WTODSB 
insists on its own jurisdiction when it is in a jurisdictional conflict with a 
RTA. 
The proposed exclusive forum clause in the WTO legal texts offers 
the WTO panel or Appellate Body enough legal ground for the objection 
to admissibility167 if one particular case has already been settled or is 
being settled by the DSM of a RTA. Based on the proposed exclusive 
clause in the WTO legal texts, the WTO panel or Appellate Body will no 
longer insist on its jurisdiction on a dispute already settled or being 
settled by the DSM of a RTA. The proposed exclusive forum clause in 
the WTO legal texts stipulates that once the dispute settlement 
proceeding under the DSU or any other dispute settlement mechanism of 
a RTA established under the Article XXIV of GATT 1994 has been 
involved with respect to any dispute, the forum selected by the 
complaining party shall be used to the exclusion of any other for that 
dispute. Although WTO panels or its Appellate may refuse to settle a 
dispute before it, they do not violate their obligations under the DSU 
because of the proposed exclusive forum clause.168  
If there is an exclusive forum clause in the WTO legal texts, a 
disputing party will not seek refuge from another DSM to achieve its 
desired outcome because the former DSM’s decision is unfavorable. In 
the Argentina—Poultry case, Brazil re-litigated the same dispute in the 
  
 165. WT/DS308/R, supra note 27, at ¶ 7.18. 
 166. WT/DS308/AB/R, supra note 9, at ¶ 51. 
 167. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 177 (Nov. 6) (The ICJ has 
well developed the theory about admissibility and interprets it in the Oil Platforms case as 
follows: “Objections to admissibility [‘recevabilite´] normally take the form of an 
assertion that, even if the Court has jurisdiction and the facts stated by the applicant State 
are assumed to be correct, nonetheless there are reasons why the Court should not 
proceed to an examination of the merits.”). 
 168. See supra notes 33 and 34. 
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WTO DSB because the award of the MERCOSUR tribunal is 
undesirable. Argentina, of course, opposed the WTO Panel’s exercise of 
jurisdiction and requested that “in light of the prior MERCOSUR 
proceedings, the Panel refrain[ed] from ruling on the claims raised by 
Brazil in the present WTO dispute settlement proceedings.”169 The WTO 
Panel dismissed Argentina’s suggestions because the WTO Panel 
considered that “there [was] no basis for a WTO panel to apply the 
principle of estoppel.”170 
The proposed exclusive forum clause in the WTO legal texts will 
become the legal ground for a WTO panel or its Appellate Body to 
refrain from ruling on the claims already settled in the DSM of a 
particular RTA. According to the proposed exclusive forum clause, if the 
dispute settlement proceeding under the dispute settlement mechanism of 
a RTA has been involved with respect to a particular dispute, such forum 
selected by the complaining party shall be used to the exclusion of any 
other for that dispute, including the WTO DSB.171 Therefore, the 
involved disputing parties will not rely on the WTO DSB to achieve its 
desired outcome even though they do not satisfy the award of the RTA’s 
DSM. The WTO DSB will also refrain from ruling on the claims already 
settled in the RTA’s DSM. 
It is not only beneficial but also necessary to require the WTO to 
follow the model of exclusive forum clauses already adopted in many 
RTAs. Under this circumstance, the forum chosen for settling the 
overlapping dispute is the same, no matter whether the forum is chosen 
according to the WTO’s exclusive forum clause or the exclusive forum 
clauses of those RTAs.172 For instance, if a disputing party first brings a 
dispute to the tribunal under a RTA, the exclusive forum clauses of the 
WTO and that RTA will both justify the tribunal under that RTA to be 
the dispute settlement forum as discussed in the former part of this 
section. Consequently, jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and 
RTAs are avoided.  
  
 169. WT/DS241/R, supra note 10, at ¶ 7.17. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See notes 33 and 34. 
 172. Id.  
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The proposed exclusive forum clause in the WTO legal texts will 
reduce the waste of the cost and time caused by parallel proceedings 
concerning the same dispute and avoids inconsistent awards.173 In the 
Brazil—Retreaded Types case, the WTO Panel recommended the Brazil 
to bring the inconsistency of the MERCOSUR exemption into 
conformity with the requirements of the chapeau of the Article XX.174 
However, the application by Brazil of MERCOSUR exemption is in 
response to the ruling of a MERCOSUR panel and it is the Brazil’s 
obligation under MERCOSUR.175 Disputing parties will face difficulties 
to implement the overlapping awards when the recommendations of the 
overlapping awards are contrary. The proposed exclusive forum clause 
allows the WTO DSB to give up its jurisdiction when such dispute is 
being or already settled by the RTA’s DSM with an exclusive 
jurisdiction. That is the convenience to disputing parties, which reduce 
the risk of disputing parties to implement double awards of both the 
WTO DSB and the RTA’s DSM. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs are more and 
more serious because RTAs continue to blossom. The forum choice 
clause is considered by this article as an effective and fundamental 
measure to resolve these jurisdictional overlaps. This measure directly 
aims at resolving the lack of a forum choice clause in WTO legal texts, 
which is the main causation of jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO 
and RTAs. The suggestion of this article is to amend the WTO legal texts 
to offer WTO panels or its Appellate Body a forum choice clause in 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This amendment ensures that 
WTO panels or its Appellate Body has the legal ground in the WTO 
legal texts to apply a forum choice clause to settle jurisdiction conflicts 
between the WTO and RTAs. However, pertinent general principles of 
international law are not stipulated in the WTO legal texts. Whether to 
  
 173. See notes 12 and 15. 
 174. See WT/DS332/R, supra note 8.  
 175. See id. ¶ 2.5(e). 
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apply these principles to settle these jurisdictional conflicts is only the 
discretion of WTO panels or its Appellate Body. 
There are two ways to offer a forum choice clause in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings. One way is to add a new clause in the WTO 
legal texts. This clause will allow WTO panels or its Appellate Body to 
apply the forum choice clause of a particular RTA to settle jurisdictional 
conflicts between the WTO and that RTA. The lex posterior principle, 
the lex specialis principle, and the forum choice clause considered as the 
evidence of the appropriate dispute settlement forum chosen by disputing 
parties themselves are the legal bases to support this kind of amendment. 
The other way is to directly stipulate an exclusive forum clause in the 
WTO legal texts. Based on this amendment, WTO panels or its Appellate 
Body will have to rely on this exclusive forum clause to settle 
jurisdictional conflicts between the WTO and RTAs because this clause 
has already become the treaty obligation of WTO panels or its Appellate 
Body. Consequently, this method will fundamentally settle jurisdictional 
conflicts between the WTO and RTAs. 
 
